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Abstract: A near-ubiquitous concept in legal debates on contemporary approaches to market 
regulation and reform, liberalisation broadly speaking involves a transition from controlled to 
competitive markets. Yet for many, liberalisation implies not merely practical processes and legal 
instruments of economic reorganisation and governance, but moreover a higher-level 
conception of how markets fit within society, and thus how law might be deployed to achieve 
wider social and economic goals. This article explores the concept of liberalisation in both its 
technical and more-disputed normative dimensions, seeking to situate the latter within an 
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It is a political imperative, pursued for itself…. The policy is the policy because it is the 
policy.1 
 
Embraced as indispensable to efficiency and growth by some, a bête noire in the 
vein of blind neoliberalism for others, economic liberalisation broadly speaking 
implies a transition from controlled to competitive markets. Yet for a term so 
pervasive within contemporary debates about market regulation and reform, 
relatively little attention has been directed towards the concept itself. Simply put, we 
frequently mean quite different things when we talk of ‘liberalisation’. Such 
ambiguity goes beyond the technical task of designing institutions and processes for 
market governance, moreover, as liberalisation incorporates a strong normative 
dimension, reflecting implicit value judgments about the benefit of markets 
alongside optimal approaches to economic and even social ordering. This article 
explores the concept of liberalisation with respect to both its technical and more-
disputed normative elements, seeking to situate the latter within an understanding 
of the functioning—and limitations—of the former. 
Examples of liberalisation span a broad spectrum of economic activity. The 
UK’s telecommunications incumbent, for instance, has been subject to successive 
waves of privatisation, market opening, and structural reorganisation from the mid-
1980s. The granting of cabotage rights over the Dublin-London air route similarly 
enabled a successful challenge to the existing duopoly of flag carriers, launched the 
business of what became Europe’s largest low-cost carrier, and saw the city pair 
develop into the world’s second busiest route. More complex instances pertain to 
the liberal professions, such as the transformation of legal services through reform 
of restrictions on entry and practice. The most divisive examples involve public 
services, where liberalisation implies the possibility of separating doctrine from 
institutional form.2 
The near ubiquity of liberalisation in modern economies should not obscure 
its contentious nature. Opponents question the effectiveness of liberalising reforms 
in practice, while developments such as privatisation and marketisation challenge 
the balance of public and private power within society. Debates take a strikingly 
polarised form: from a vision of unliberalised markets as sacrificing consumer 
welfare to protect vested interests, whether public or private; to viewing 
liberalisation as a dogmatic enterprise that aims to introduce market forces at any 
cost and as an end itself3—the ‘commodification of everything’.4 Accurately or otherwise, 
for many the concept of liberalisation is inextricably linked to other so-called 
                                                      
1 The well-known rationalisation of privatisation/liberalisation of BT, quoted in Hodge, Privatisation. An 
International Review of Performance (2000), 24.  
2 Prosser, The Limits of Competition Law (2005), 107. 
3 Ibid, 123. 
4 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (2005), 165. 
  




neoliberal phenomena such as globalisation, austerity and even authoritarian 
liberalism.5 For others, conversely, it is a baseline requirement for inclusion within 
the modern global market economy.6 A leading scholar thus characterised 
contemporary discourse as reflecting ‘a kind of “us and them” syndrome’.7 
The task of this paper is not to resolve such—perhaps indeterminable—
disputes, but instead to explore what we mean, or might mean, when we talk of 
liberalisation. The starting point is that the term exists on two distinct planes.8  
Liberalisation is, first, a technical concept, describing processes of market 
restructuring and change. Yet liberalisation has a markedly normative dimension, 
reflecting views on the optimal operation of markets, and society beyond. 
Contemporary discourse is complicated by the fact that it is often unclear which 
dimension is invoked; or, where potentially both, the extent to which views on one 
colour approaches to the other.9 Although the practical task of liberalisation is well-
traversed in economic literature, there is an absence of work that addresses the 
concept of liberalisation as such. A central aim of this paper is to consider how the 
first technical dimension may be reflected in the second more-disputed normative 
aspect, creating scope for critical thinking on the intersection of the political ideas 
and economic processes that liberalisation represents. The paper thus identifies and 
explores various ideological perspectives—some competing, some overlapping—
on the concept of liberalisation and what it is intended to achieve. In so doing, we 
draw on examples from a range of jurisdictions and market circumstances.   
Our primary purpose is taxonomical: to identify, explain and critique the 
elements that feed into the understanding of liberalisation as it exists within 
contemporary regulatory discourse and practice. We do so primarily from a legal 
standpoint, given that liberalisation has functioned repeatedly as both prompt for 
and construct within law-making processes. Accordingly, while we discuss political 
ideologies, pursued through technical processes of economic policymaking, at its 
core these market-making or -shaping activities are mediated through law.10 
Moreover, although liberalisation is not a settled legal term-of-art, it has significant 
                                                      
5 See e.g. early references to liberalisation in Heller, “Authoritarian Liberalism?”, republished in 21 
European Law Journal 295 (2015). 
6 Clifton, Comín & Díaz Fuentes, “Privatizing public enterprises in the European Union 1960–2002: 
ideological, pragmatic, inevitable?” 13 Journal of European Public Policy 736 (2006), 738. 
7 Hodge (2000), 4. 
8 The suggestion is neither novel nor controversial: see e.g. Picciotto, “Liberalisation and Democratisation,” 
77 Law & Contemporary Problems 157 (2014), 160-61. 
9 Foucault described this phenomenon as ‘adherence to a type of governmentality’. The Birth of Biopolitics (1979) 
[2008 edition], 89. 
10 Making equivalent observations, see Singh Grewal & Purdy, “Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism,” 77 
Law & Contemporary Problems 1 (2014), 9, and Bauman, “Forward,” 63 Law and Contemporary Problems 1 (2000), 
10.  On the relationship between politics, economics and law here, see Aman, “Deregulation in the United 
States” in Geradin (ed.) The Liberalisation of State Monopolies in the European Union and Beyond (2000), 304. 
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 4 
presence within both substantive law and law-making procedures.11 Both processes 
and underlying policy objectives thus need to be cognisable in legal terms.  
A more oblique purpose is to supplement existing evaluative frameworks for 
market intervention. By exposing the ideological assumptions that underpin 
liberalisation, it becomes possible to develop more nuanced metrics by which to 
measure the success of any effort. Yet the paper is not itself an ideological one in 
any positive sense insofar as this may imply principled arguments for or against 
liberalisation in the abstract. The available empirical evidence is hugely mixed as to 
when and why liberalisation generates benefits: in short, ‘it depends,’ varying with 
market circumstances and means utilised. Many reforms are pursued with laudable 
aims,12 and even critics acknowledge that liberalisation has delivered certain tangible 
benefits.13 Concerns persist, however, that liberalisation facilitates cronyism; 
increases inequality; leads, primarily, to the advantaging of rent-seeking financial 
investors;14 or negatively impacts dynamic efficiency.15 More fundamentally, the 
deeper question of why we favour or dispute liberalisation as such implies a particular 
conception of the good that lies outside the ambition of this work. The impossibility 
of presenting a wholly disinterested account of disputed normative phenomena such 
as liberalisation means that we necessarily engage with the merits of the underlying 
claims to an extent. Nonetheless, our aim is principally to investigate the higher-
level concerns that may prompt liberalisation efforts, rather than to advocate for or 
against such activity in the abstract. 
The focus of this paper is liberalisation in the context of microeconomic 
reform, that is, expansion of market forces within the domestic economy, or, within 
the EU, the internal market. We thus borrow the notion of ‘economic activity’ from 
EU law, which focuses on the potential for competition at enterprise level.16 
Notably, this does not require the current existence of a competitive market, thus 
encompassing, inter alia, public and monopoly provision.17 Conversely, although the 
term liberalisation is also deployed in the macroeconomic context, particularly 
regarding trade, its use and implications here lie outside the paper’s scope. This 
decision is explained partly due to space, but also salience. Although trade and 
domestic liberalisation can go hand in hand, they remain functionally and 
conceptually distinct, as illustrated, for example, by their discrete existences within 
                                                      
11 Within EU law, the term is found in the foundational Treaties (Articles 58-60 TEU), secondary legislation 
(Article 1(2), Directive 2006/123/EC) and jurisprudence of the Union Courts (e.g. C-265/08 Federutility 
EU:C:2010:205, para.32). 
12 Hodge (2000), 230. 
13 Prosser (2005), 237. 
14 Florio, Network Industries and Social Welfare: The Experiment that Reshuffled European Utilities (2013), 352-53. 
15 Pollitt, “The Role of Policy in Energy Transitions: Lessons from the Energy Liberalisation Era,” 50 
Energy Policy 128 (2012), 128; and Krämer & Schnurr, “A Unified Framework for Open Access Regulation 
of Telecommunications Infrastructure,” 38 Telecommunications Policy 1160 (2014).  
16 C-41/90 Höfner EU:C:1991:161, para.21. 
17 Opinion of AG Jacobs in C-67/96 Albany EU:C:1999:430, para.311.  
  




the (much-disputed) Washington Consensus.18 The circumscribed scope of our 
inquiry does not preclude the possibility, however, that the ideological currents 
considered may have broader resonance. 
Finally, a caveat: although liberalisation is not a zero-sum game, typically there 
are winners and losers.19 The process of ‘creative destruction’ can wreak havoc on 
company profits, conditions or levels of employment, and even firm survival. Such 
losses may be justified on the utilitarian basis that the majority benefits overall, or 
the more individualistic basis that the claims of the so-called losers were illegitimate 
from the outset; but we must nonetheless acknowledge the potential negative 
consequences of liberalisation for some, even where we find greater good overall. 
The oftentimes ambiguous virtues of liberalisation inform more practically-oriented 
critiques, considered in the discussion below. 
The article is structured as follows. Section B introduces liberalisation as a 
functional concept, exploring its practical manifestations as legal processes of 
market restructuring. Section C considers the concept of liberalisation in more 
normative terms, introducing and assessing six higher-level rationales or 
‘perspectives’ that may explain or motivate the policy choice to liberalise. Without 
being exchuastive in scope, these reflect the principal currents of contemporary 
liberalisation practice, and thus bring greater clarity to the notion that liberalisation 
can be an ideological phenomenom. Section D considers the implications of the 




B. LIBERALISATION—A FUNCTIONAL CONCEPT 
 
To ground the normative analysis that follows in concrete legal and market 
phenomena, we begin by exploring liberalisation in its technical sense: that is, its 
manifestations in practice as processes and/or instruments of economic 
reorganisation. In this context, liberalisation is a concept frequently invoked yet 
rarely defined. Most work—whether approaching liberalisation from legal, 
economic or public policy-oriented perspectives—proceeds on the basis that there 
is some settled, readily cognisable, albeit implicit, understanding of the term, thus 
negating any threshold necessity to discuss its specific definition. It nonetheless 
remains worthwhile to consider the assumed meaning(s) precisely, not least because 
a survey of relevant literature reveals a spectrum of differing approaches. Our goal 
is to sketch these parameters. 
                                                      
18 Serra, Spiegel & Stiglitz, “Introduction” in Serra & Stiglitz (eds.), The Washington Consensus Reconsidered 
(2008). 
19 Pelkmans & Luchetta, Enjoying a Single Market for Network Industries? Notre Europea—Jacques Delors 
Institute, Studies & Reports 95 (February 2013). 
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 6 
Some existing ambiguity may stem from the nebulous nature of the word 
‘liberal’.20 The broadest definition of liberalisation offered by the Oxford English 
Dictionary puts liberal at its core, namely as: ‘the action or process of liberalising; the fact 
of being liberalised or becoming liberal; an instance of this.’21 Yet the values implicit in that 
term are not fixed, so it means quite different things in different circumstances or 
to different people. Invoked in a political context, liberal runs the gamut from right 
to left. In popular perception, a liberal parent might imply understanding or 
irresponsibility, realism or naïveté. While the OED identifies a distinct sense within 
economics as ‘favouring or being characterised by unrestricted trade’—a definition with some 
but not full resonance below—it offers a plethora of alternative meanings,22 which 
complicate the understanding and implications of the term to the extent that 
liberalisation is a sociological concept as well as a technical one.  
To avert this difficulty, and to avoid prejudging the normative assessment to 
follow, we consider liberalisation primarily in functional terms: that is, how it is 
effected in markets.23 A functional definition is appropriate because it captures the 
nature of liberalisation as a process of market recalibration.24 As noted, the OED 
defines liberalisation, generally, in inherently dynamic terms as an ‘action or process’.25 
This is supplemented by a second, technical definition, which places a similar focus 
upon its dynamic nature: ‘[t]he removal or reduction of restrictions placed upon (a particular 
sphere of) economic activity; an instance of this.’26 This latter definition, which adheres 
closely to popular usage albeit at an abstract level, introduces an additional theme: 
that of liberalisation as a movement from organised approaches to market 
governance towards a greater embrace of open or competitive forces. Notably, this 
definition does not set up a dichotomy between state and market, but instead 
between controlled and free economic activity. We return to this distinction below. 
Both themes—liberalisation as a process, and a shift from market control to 
competition—underlie other (succinct) definitions that have been advanced.  
Armstrong and Sappington define liberalisation as ‘the transition to competitive market 
conditions’.27 Newbery identifies it as the task of subjecting sectors or businesses to 
market forces.28 Other similar, and similarly brief, approaches include: ‘restructuring, 
regulatory reform and the development of competitive markets,’29 ‘the creation or deepening of a 
                                                      
20 See, generally, Harvey (2005), 50. 
21 OED Third Edition, November 2010. 
22 Including generous, ample-bodied, absence of prudence or decorum, unobstructed, broadly construed, 
tolerant, and pursuit of civil liberties or social reform. 
23 Adopting a similar approach, see Pelkmans & Luchetta (2013), 17. 
24 See Aman (2000), 264, describing policies towards liberalisation as ‘a transition’. 
25 OED Third Edition, November 2010. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Armstrong & Sappington, “Regulation, Competition, and Liberalization,” XLIV Journal of Economic 
Literature 325 (2006), 325. 
28 Newbery, “Privatisation and Liberalisation of Network Industries,” 41 European Economic Review 357 
(1996), 358. 
29 Karova, Liberalisation of Electricity Markets and Public Service Obligations in the Energy Community (2012), 4. 
  




competitive market,’30 or simply ‘opening to competition’.31 By contrast, in his work on 
economic regulation, Decker rejects the term because of its ‘ideological overtones’—a 
point explored below—, instead substituting the phrase ‘restructuring policies’ for 
markets.32 
These high-level descriptions raise two interrelated issues. The first is the sort 
of market conditions that liberalisation aims to move from, and towards. While 
microeconomic theory posits two basic models of organisation, monopoly versus 
perfect competition, most real-world structures lies between these poles. 
Liberalisation implies that, initially, economic activity is constrained by certain 
obstacles to unencumbered competition. Such constraints go beyond the 
recognition that atomistic competition is unrealistic: in effect, liberalisation 
presupposes that there is more that can be done to open a sector to competition.33 
Three principal obstacles are relevant: structural barriers, legal barriers, and non-
market status.  
The most obvious structural barrier is the presence of significant scale 
economies, or natural monopoly, where a single firm meets demand more efficiently 
than any combination of firms.34 Historically, such markets were serviced by single 
vertically-integrated, often state-owned providers. The disadvantages are well-
known: the need for strict (often politicised) regulation; inefficiency, due to an 
absence of market-discipline; and unresponsiveness to customers.35 Similar 
tendencies towards monopoly arise from network effects, whereby demand 
increases with consumption.36 Liberalisation aims at disaggregation of integrated 
markets, and introduction of competition into potentially competitive segments. 
Where a firm is publicly-owned, at least partial privatisation may be contemplated. 
Others obstacles are legal in nature. Regulatory barriers reduce competition 
and efficiency by limiting participants or raising costs.37 State-imposed or -approved 
licencing requirements restrict entry or dictate aspects of product or service 
provision, whether on a quantitative or qualitative basis. Other controls—price 
regulation, or marketing restrictions—similarly have cost- or rent-creating effects. 
Often there are legitimate reasons to supervise entry or participation, from 
consumer protection to safety, moral hazard or environmental concerns. 
Liberalisation typically entails a loosening of these conditions, yet must contend with 
the underlying public interest justifications for the initial regulation. 
                                                      
30 Pollitt (2012), 129. 
31 Geradin, “Introduction” in Geradin (ed.) The Liberalisation of State Monopolies in the European Union and 
Beyond (2000), xi. 
32 Decker, Modern Economic Regulation (2015), 2, fn.2. 
33 We exclude social and environmental regulation; whilst these constrain unencumbered competition, 
libertarian arguments for wholesale ‘deregulation’ are distinguishable from sector-specific liberalisation.   
34 OECD, Restructuring Public Utilities for Competition (2001), 8. 
35 Pelkmans & Luchetta (2013), 8. 
36 OECD (2001), 8. 
37 Copenhagen Economics, Regulation and Productivity in the Private Services Sectors, Background report for 
Danish Productivity Commission, May 2013. 
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 8 
Most controversial is use of liberalisation as a synonym for ‘marketisation’ of 
public service provision.38 Economists—and policymakers—apply market theory, 
and thus extol the benefit of market forces, to a broader range of activities and 
actors than the average citizen might recognise as within the ‘market’ as such. We 
thus also talk about liberalisation when bringing into the sphere of the market 
activities that were, historically, considered to constitute inherently public and thus 
non-market functions. 
The second key issue involves the processes by which liberalisation might be 
realised in the marketplace. It is at this juncture that law is almost inevitably called upon 
to provide expression to the liberalisation process and its outcomes.39 Yet one 
reason why any high-level definition of liberalisation is of limited utility is that the 
term covers a multitude of legal processes and instruments that impact the market 
in different ways. Broadly speaking, each serves to lower barriers to entry by 
additional economic actors or, more proactively, to encourage or assist entry.40   
A preliminary distinction must be drawn between two ideas of liberalisation—
one narrow, one broad41—which each find traction in existing literature.42 The 
narrow interpretation includes only efforts that aim, specifically, at ‘liberalising prices 
and access to markets which had previously been restricted by legal and regulatory barriers’.43 The 
broad interpretation is a synonym for reform and restructuring of markets more 
generally: it refers to the shift ‘from using public policy instruments, such as regulation or 
public ownership of enterprises, to a greater reliance on market mechanisms and incentives to pursue 
consumer welfare, industrial, regional and/or employment objectives.’44 The former might be 
deemed a literal approach, including only mechanisms that have as their precise 
objective the removal of specific obstacles to competition. The latter is an essentially 
holistic one, including all regulatory efforts to reorient a sector towards the 
competitive paradigm.  In this work, we adopt a similarly broad approach, in part 
because it reflects ordinary usage of the term, in part because of the mutually 
reinforcing nature of the legal mechanisms that comprise the liberalisation toolbox.  
Policies aimed directly at market opening are the clearest means to achieve 
liberalisation, and reflect its narrowest interpretation.45 These include removal of 
monopoly or special rights, and, where entry requires access to essential 
infrastructure, mandatory sharing obligations. If barriers are legal, reform of 
licencing conditions or some degree of deregulation is required.46 Somewhat 
                                                      
38 Prosser (2005), 1-2. 
39 Hodge (2000), 227. 
40 See, generally, Armstrong & Sappington (2006). 
41 Discussing an equivalent debate within privatisation, see Hodge (2000), 14-15. 
42 Adopting a narrow conception, see e.g. Clifton et al. (2006) and Florio (2013). Reflecting the broader 
conception, see e.g. Pollitt (2012); Levi-Faur, “The Politics of Liberalisation,” 42 European Journal of Political 
Research 705 (2003); and Prosser (2005), 99. 
43 Gönenç, Maher & Nicoletti, “The Implementation and the Effects of Regulatory Reform: Past 
Experience and Current Issues,” OECD Economic Studies No. 32, 2001/I, pp.11-98 (2001), 12. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Pelkmans & Luchetta (2013), 40. 
46 Ibid, 17. 
  




paradoxically, however, liberalisation can result in greater quantities of regulation, 
particularly where the incumbent retains significant power.47 Thus, ‘regulation-for-
competition’ combines deregulation and reregulation.48 It differs from command-
and-control approaches, however, seeking to increase incentives for efficiency while 
minimising the regulatory burden.49 Concepts like ‘responsive regulation,’50 ‘better 
regulation,’51 and ‘smart regulation’52 abound. Regulators also grapple with non-
economic objectives—such as funding of public service obligations53—and how 
pursuit of such goals can be accommodated within a competitive environment.54 
Structural reorganisation—typically, vertical separation—offers a more 
oblique means of liberalisation.55 Reorganisation is appropriate where the integrated 
structure of the incumbent gives it the ability and incentive to restrict competition. 
The market is ‘liberalised’ insofar as possibilities for future competition are 
strengthened: reduction of behavioural barriers to entry, reduced need for regulatory 
oversight, and/or increased numbers of economic actors. Yet, where integration 
generates efficiencies, reorganisation may involve a trade-off between the benefits 
of increased competition and efficiency losses that follow separation.56 
Privatisation is a particularly controversial element of any liberalisation agenda. 
It involves, most prominently, sale of public enterprises, but can also encompass a 
shift to private provision through contracting out with public funding.57 By exiting 
the market in which it is monopoly supplier, the State creates space, opportunity 
and incentives for private entry, governed by normal competitive forces; and, where 
accompanied by structural reorganisation and/or mandatory access rights, with 
potential for competition between competing suppliers. To succeed as liberalisation 
in practice, privatisation requires regulatory reform and market-opening58—though 
the converse is not necessarily true.59   
Finally, antitrust scrutiny can have liberalising effect, de facto or de jure.60 The mere 
existence of competition law facilitates liberalisation in some instances. Initial 
efforts to liberalise the German energy sector, for instance, took the form of 
removing a pre-existing antitrust exemption,61 while liberalisation of the Scottish 
                                                      
47 Sauter, Public Services in EU Law (2014), 32. 
48 Levi-Faur (2003), 708. 
49 Gönenç et al. (2001), 26. 
50 Ayres & Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (1992). 
51 Weatherill (ed.), Better Regulation (2007). 
52 European Commission, Smart Regulation in the European Union COM(2010) 543.  
53 Gönenç et al. (2001), 47-54. 
54 Ibid, 26. 
55 See extended discussion in OECD (2001). 
56 Lafontaine & Slade, “Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence,” 45 Journal of Economic 
Literature 629 (2007). 
57 Hodge (2000), 14. 
58 Gönenç et al. (2001), 58. 
59 Florio (2013), 341. 
60 Pelkmans & Luchetta (2013), 18; Damjanovic, “The EU Market Rules as Social Market Rules: Why the 
EU can be a Social Market Actor,” 50 CMLRev 1685 (2013), 1705; and Sauter (2014), especially chpt.4. 
61 Von Danwitz, “Regulation and Liberalisation of the European Electricity Market—A German View,” 
27 Energy Law Journal 423. 
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water industry was prompted by modernisation of UK competition law.62 
Alternatively, competition enforcers may target efforts, instrumentally, to achieve 
equivalent outcomes, whether seeking to prompt, supplement or compensate for an 
absence of liberalisation in the sector concerned. The break-up of AT&T is perhaps 
the most famous example of antitrust enforcement securing an outcome in line with 
liberalisation goals,63 while a strategic use of EU competition law is similarly a 
central, contentious aspect of efforts to develop the internal market.64 
Accordingly, we reach an interim assessment of liberalisation in functional 
terms as a process of market reorientation or reorganisation towards the competitive 
paradigm, which may encompass structural, regulatory and/or ownership 
transformations. We now turn to the more subjective focus of this article: the 
intersection between, and use of, legal tools of market liberalisation to pursue 




C. NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LIBERALISATION 
 
From the standpoint of economic theory, the rationale for liberalisation is 
straightforward: ‘competition provides stronger and less manipulable incentives to efficiency than 
regulation.’65 The truism that increased competition generates increased consumer 
welfare and thus societal benefit is premised on the perceived superiority of 
competition in contradistinction to public or private control: greater efficiency, 
innovation and consumer choice, with reduced need for costly, potentially 
counterproductive regulation.66 Since, in theory, markets are a better steward of 
economic activity than governmental planning or private monopoly or oligopoly, 
the logic of liberalisation dictates that there should be ‘more market’ where possible. 
This viewpoint was underscored in the late twentieth century by failure of many 
centrally-planned economies.67 
Despite the textbook case for liberalisation, however, at its core this is not a 
purely technical activity. Rarely has theory been translated into practice with such 
vigour; an assessment more remarkable given that liberalisation is often on the 
policy agenda in markets where the public interest considerations at stake are not 
purely economic. That is, such markets are ‘special… because of the nature of the needs 
they satisfy,’ and thus are part of the broader social fabric.68 Moreover, translating the 
theory of liberalisation into successful practice has proven less than straightforward: 
                                                      
62 Sawkins, “The Introduction of Competition into the Scottish Water Industry,” 20 Utilities Policy 22 (2012). 
63 US v AT&T, 552 F.Supp.131 (DDC 1982). 
64 See, e.g. within the telecommunications sector, C-202/07 France Télécom EU:C:2009:214, C-280/08 
Deutsche Telekom EU:C:2010:603 and C-295/12 Telefónica EU:C:2014:2062. 
65 Newbery (1996), 368. 
66 OECD (2001), 10. 
67 Hodge (2000), 31. 
68 Florio (2013), 347. 
  




the empirical evidence is equivocal, while resulting market structures are more 
complex than anticipated.69  
Since the choice to opt for liberalisation is neither inevitable nor indisputable, 
the decision to do so reflects not merely a textbook understanding of the optimal 
operation of markets (and, indeed, what constitutes a ‘market’), but also a positive 
decision to enhance competition and market forces over the status quo. At its root 
the determination to liberalise reflects a community choice about organisation of 
society, and the respective roles for the public and private sectors.70 The 
motivation(s) underlying such a choice typically have some normative element.  This 
notion—that liberalisation is, at least partly, an ideological phenomenon—is 
uncontroversial.71 Less well explored, however, are the meaning and implications of 
the normative dimension of liberalisation. We use the phrases ‘normative’ or 
‘ideological’ here to denote deeper rationales for intervention that extend beyond 
the immediate circumstances of the (perceived) market failure. Instead, the 
underlying policy motivation is some higher-level understanding of the optimal 
structure and functioning of markets—and, beyond this, occasionally, of society 
more generally. Such normative or ideological perspectives may be manifested 
through various factors, including the political persuasion of policymakers, the 
discourse surrounding liberalisation, and the process of constructing consent for 
interventions. 
It is not our contention, however, that all liberalisation is motivated solely by 
high-level normative goals, nor that any decision to liberalise is reducible to a single 
(or even primary) rationale. Liberalisation as policy prescription has been supported 
by both normative arguments regarding economic freedom and political liberty, and 
positive arguments regarding government failures and the pursuit of efficiency.72 
The reasons why any strategy is adopted are often multifaceted,73 encompassing 
express and tacit objectives. The motivations for the Thatcherite liberalisation 
efforts of the 1980s, for instance, comprised an expansive and quixotic list including 
control of public-sector pay and weakening of public-sector unions, widening of 
share ownership, and contraction of perceived state dependency.74 The immediate 
prompt may, conversely, be pragmatic or circumstantial: for example, realising the 
value of public assets is the purpose of much of the privatisation and market-
opening activity undertaken to resolve the European sovereign debt crisis. The 
notion of normative motivation must also be distinguished from the concrete 
objectives, stated or implicit, that a reform programme seeks to achieve. Although 
there can be considerable overlap, the latter provide specific market goals to be 
attained, and thus a direct explanation for discrete positive efforts. The underlying 
                                                      
69 See fns.13-15 above. 
70 Hodge (2000), 245. 
71 Arriving at similar assessment, see e.g. Newbery (1996), 359; Pollitt (2012), 135; and Decker (2015), 2. 
72 Levi-Faur (2003), 711. 
73 Hodge (2000), 45. 
74 Gamble, “Privatisation, Thatcherism, and the British State,” 16 Journal of Law & Society 1 (1989), 11.  
                           6/2017 
 
 12 
normative rationale, by contrast, explains why these goals are desirable, and how 
this links to the chosen means of realisation. Ultimately, such concerns may be a 
more forceful driver of liberalisation than explicit policy objectives, to the point 
where the latter become mere ‘statements of hope and assertion’.75 Our purpose is simply 
to explain how ideological goals can drive liberalisation, and to identify normative 
strands in existing practice. 
The most pessimistic approach conceives of liberalisation as itself an ideology: 
the notion of ‘liberalisation for liberalisation’s sake’.76 Rejecting this almost nihilistic 
stance, we endeavour to take a more nuanced (though not necessarily more 
optimistic) approach, exploring six normative perspectives that may inform or 
prompt liberalisation processes. These perspectives, without being exhaustive in 
scope, reflect the key ideological currents discernible within contemporary 
regulatory practice, and thus shed greater light on the notion that liberalisation is or 
can be a normative phenomenon.   
Our first four perspectives—namely, state market withdrawal, avoidance of inefficient 
regulation, harnessing of market forces, and consumer sovereignty—are grouped under the 
heading of ‘neoliberal’. At the core of each lies the view that market forces, and the 
self-interested wealth-maximising choices of private actors, constitute the best 
means to order society, and particularly, economic activity. Markets stand in 
contradistinction to governmental ordering which, these perspectives declare, is 
variously inappropriate, ineffective, or sub-optimal. Thus, the least restrictive 
alternative—most market, least state—should be adopted wherever possible.77 Each 
accordingly draws upon well-established theories of neoclassical economics 
regarding the efficient functioning of competitive markets. The danger inherent in 
the term ‘neoliberal’—potentially ‘too vague or polemical for responsible use’78—is 
acknowledged. We use it, loosely, to denote concerns that reflect some variation on 
the theme of ‘less state/more market’ in economic governance.79 What distinguishes 
each is the emphasis placed within this shifting balance. An alternative is to describe 
this category as ‘efficiency-focused,’ insofar as each theory aims, wholly or partly, to 
maximise efficiency through greater use of or deference to the market mechanism: 
whether by avoiding inefficient economic activity or regulation by government, or 
maximising productive or allocative efficiency by making markets work more 
effectively.   
Yet the pursuit of liberalisation does not always translate into a simple ‘less 
state/more market’ dichotomy. Two further bases can alternatively be advanced, 
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namely to combat market power and increase market participation. Both involve a 
‘participatory’ understanding of how markets function and what liberalisation 
achieves, viewing the promised ‘open markets’ in largely instrumental terms: 
markets are pried open, not because undistorted competition is itself a good, but 
because an open marketplace enables attainment of other socially valuable 
objectives. These latter perspectives depart from the efficiency focus of the 
neoliberal theories insofar as they are compatible with inefficient participation that 
nevertheless furthers such objectives. Moreover, the participatory conceptions are 
not premised upon any opposition of state and market, which at least the first three 
neoliberal theories imply, and indeed, can be invoked to support efforts that attack 
aggregations of private rather than public power. 
For each normative perspective, we set out its broad contours, describing its 
underlying premises. We explain how the ideological objective underlying each can 
be furthered through liberalisation, particularly how and to what extent the market 
opening process links to the basic ideology. To support our contention that 
normative concerns have informed, to a greater or lesser extent, much liberalisation 
activity in recent decades, we draw links to liberalisation in practice, identifying 
examples in which such influences are either explicit or might be inferred. Finally, 
consideration is given to the potential limitations of each, in practical and ideological 
terms.   
 
1. ‘ROLLING BACK THE STATE’ 
 
I.   
First, liberalisation may provide a strategy of state market withdrawal, typically through 
privatisation of public enterprises, or contracting out of public services. This 
represents, in effect, a rejection of the State qua economic actor within the 
marketplace.   
As described, privatisation functions as a technique of liberalisation by creating 
opportunity and incentives for private operators to enter the marketplace, replacing 
the former public provider. Yet the real focus of privatisation may be less on 
securing new entry, but instead on removing the state from the realm of economic 
activity. Implicit here is an ability to distinguish between two separate spheres of 
activity: public non-economic activity on the one hand; private economic activity 
on the other. The only appropriate role for the State is within the context of the 
first. Where, however, the State already operates within the ostensible private 
sphere—for example, through public ownership of utility providers—liberalisation 
provides a means to ‘roll back the frontiers of the State,’ as Thatcher put the task, 
by creating an exit strategy for the public provider. Continuity of service is ensured 
through new entry by private providers. Our first normative perspective is thus 
summed up in (later, Chancellor) Nigel Lawson’s exhortation that: ‘The 
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Conservative Party has never believed that the business of government is the government 
of business.’80 
This raises two interlinked questions: first, where and how is the supposed line 
between public and private spheres to be drawn; and second, why is state activity in 
the latter so disfavoured? As the iterative waves of privatisation and contracting out 
in the UK demonstrate, the answer to the first question is a moving target: from 
clearly economic activities like provision of telecommunications, energy and railway 
services, to more equivocal tasks like operation of the postal service, prisons and 
hospitals. Even accepting that these activities might potentially be provided for 
remuneration by private enterprises—and so fall within the expansive definition of 
‘economic activity’ under EU law81—it requires a significant further leap to 
conclude that the state should accordingly have no role. That is, why does the fact 
that private actors can provide a service translate into the imperative that the state 
must refrain from doing so? The ideology of state market withdrawal thus relies upon 
two related assumptions: the basic inappropriateness of the state as market actor, 
contrasted with the presumed effectiveness of private enterprise in comparison.   
One reason advanced to explain the increased levels of privatisation at the end 
of the twentieth century is the recognition that, particularly in public utility sectors, 
a (state-owned, typically) monopoly is no longer required.82 From this perspective, 
the fact that competition is increasingly possible facilitates, and may encourage, 
privatisation of the former public monopolist. Yet the mere possibility of 
competition does not alone explain its prevalence. Instead, privatisation as an end 
itself is closely associated with a broader libertarian agenda.83 In their work on 
privatisation in Europe, Clifton et al. describe how discourse in respect of public 
enterprise and service provision shifted from the 1970s, moving from a ‘social 
contract’ model premised upon positive state intervention towards a value-free 
markets-oriented approach:84 
 
As a new rhetoric and credo in the market replaced the post-war faith in the 
state, there was an assumption within the dominant modes of thinking that a 
change of ownership from public to private status would release enterprises 
from the shackles of bureaucracy and lead them via the cold winds of market 
forces to economic efficiency.85 
 
The result was, as Hodge describes, a renewed cultural enthusiasm for private 
enterprise, in contradistinction to the perceived failings of the state.86 Perhaps the 
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most (in)famous example of this ideology in practice is the wholesale privatisation 
programme implemented by the Conservative Government in the UK in the 1980s 
and 1990s, a flavour of which was demonstrated in preceding paragraphs.87 
Privatisation as a core pillar of economic policy has indeed been described as 
‘Thatcher’s personal gift to the economic policy agenda of the world’.88 As this statement implies, 
however, privatisation has been more or less enthusiastically embraced as a tenet of 
contemporary economic policy in many economies worldwide, so that the past 
quarter century has witnessed a paradigm shift from public to private provision in 
core areas. 
As political and social questions, privatisation and contracting out are hugely 
disputed: both in terms of effectiveness in practice, and, in broader constitutional 
terms, because of what they say about the nature of the state and society, and the 
citizen’s relationship to both. These concerns point to the limitations of the 
underpinning rationale. 
First, it is unclear whether private enterprise is more successful at performing 
‘economic’ functions than a public provider would be. Existing evidence is 
disputed—one commentator suggests that it is possible to find robust data 
confirming any predetermined view of the merits or otherwise of privatisation.89 
Yet, there is significant evidence that, while privatisation typically increases 
productive efficiency and profitability,90 it also results in higher prices for 
consumers, without any improvement in social performance.91 Moreover, 
privatisation often deepens social inequality, negatively impacting upon employees 
of privatised enterprises and vulnerable consumers, while benefiting executives and 
investors.92 
Another paradox of privatisation, to the extent it intends to ‘roll back the state,’ 
is that it is often accompanied by swathes of regulation that seek to reorient the 
privatised market towards competition.93 In the UK, for instance, the ensuing 
market structures have been described as ‘ordered competition’ rather than a 
competitive order as such,94 resulting in the emergence of a distinct discipline of 
public service law.95 Thus the reality of privatisation may conflict with our second 
perspective on liberalisation, which demonstrates great scepticism of the state in its 
regulatory guise. 
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A final, more ideologically-charged, challenge contests the assumption that 
economic activity and state provision are inherently incompatible. At its highest 
level, Dorfman and Harel launched a fundamental critique of privatisation ‘as such’, 
attacking it as ‘the transformation of our political system and public culture from ones 
characterised by robust shared responsibility and political engagement to ones characterised by 
fragmentation and sectarianism.’96 Such resistance is similarly implicit in the strong and 
continuing public opposition to and dissatisfaction with privatisation, despite its 
widespread adoption.97 From this viewpoint, which rebuts our first perspective on 
the basis that public provision is not only legitimate but vital in some areas, we see 
shades of Harold Wilson’s critique of privatisation as ‘selling the family silver’.98 
 
II.  
Second, liberalisation may reflect scepticism about the effectiveness of the state as 
regulator, and thus a desire to ‘free the market’ from inefficient or ineffective regulation. Here, 
liberalisation functions as a synonym for deregulation.99 As with our first 
perspective, the second evinces strong doubts regarding the desirability of state 
involvement in the marketplace. Where the two diverge is the focus of criticism: 
whether the state plays a primary role as economic actor or residual one as market 
regulator. Our second perspective suggests that, even in the latter role, state 
involvement is suboptimal, thus providing a basis for replacing public supervision 
with the invisible supervisory hand of the market mechanism. In opening markets 
by removing state-imposed barriers to competition, liberalisation facilitates this 
transition. 
The second perspective is thus in line with standard public choice prescriptions 
from political economy. Public choice adherents subscribe to the ‘capture theory’ 
of regulation: whereby the regulator is not a benign maximiser of social welfare, but 
instead a politically-motivated actor which engages in its own rent-seeking 
behaviour, and is prone to capture by regulated entities.100 Markets controlled by 
regulators are thus inherently less likely to achieve efficient outcomes than those 
under competition. Moreover, where regulators have discretion or there is 
uncertainty about the development of regulatory policy, ‘hold-up’ may occur, 
whereby firms refrain from pro-competitive investment for fear that gains will be 
expropriated by regulatory change.101 Together, these observations—that regulators 
reach less efficient outcomes than markets, and the presence or risk of regulation 
deters competitive behaviour—culminate in a prescription for liberalisation, as the 
lesser of evils.   
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The ideological underpinnings of public choice and the deregulation 
movement are beyond dispute. In setting out to debunk the flaws of the so-called 
public interest theory of regulation, it has been suggested that public choice scholars 
essentially created their own straw man against which to take aim.102 This points to 
the strong, absolutist even, ideological conviction at the heart of such theories: 
namely, an insistence that state regulatory activity is inherently flawed, regardless of 
its results in practice or the market situation that would exist in its absence. 
Deregulation is thus an end itself, rather than a means to achieve strong yet fair 
competition within liberalised markets.103 
The influence of the public choice movement is seen vividly in the US, where 
‘antiregulatory politics’ have long had traction.104 Although deregulation in earnest 
began in the 1970s,105 the ‘anti-statist ideological stance’ of the Reaganite era brought 
these ideas to particular prominence.106 Consistent with a worldview whereby ‘[t]he 
nine most terrifying words in the English language are, “I’m from the government and I’m here to 
help”,’107 Reagan’s approach to domestic policymaking was renowned for its 
deregulatory insistence.108 Indeed, his highly symbolic first executive action, within 
a week in office, was to remove remaining federal price and allocation controls in 
the oil sector.109 This move has been mimicked by Trump, who introduced a strictly 
quantitative policy of mandatory federal deregulation, justified in loaded terms that 
directly equate regulatory obligations to, in effect, spending other people’s money.110 
Our first and second normative perspectives are, essentially, two sides of the 
same coin—scepticism regarding the state in the market—with each adapted to the 
economic circumstances in which it rose to prominence. Unlike in Europe, where 
public interest was secured through state ownership, in the US the regulatory model 
historically relied upon governmental restrictions and requirements applied to 
private entities.111 In this latter context, the task of ‘rolling back the state’ naturally 
focused on limiting its regulatory role. This is not to suggest, however, that the 
ideology of ‘freeing the market’ has been absent across the Atlantic. In tandem with 
privatisation, the Thatcher government sought to ease what were styled as ‘burdens 
on business’ by limiting (‘to stem the flow’) the quantity of new regulation enacted.112 
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While New Labour focused initially on improving the quality rather than quantity 
of regulation adopted, in time it too rediscovered the language of regulation as 
‘burdens’.113 This reached its apotheosis under the Coalition government, which 
introduced an express requirement of ‘one in, one out’ for regulation,114 
subsequently ratcheted up to ‘one in, two out’.115 Such an approach to state 
intervention—viewed as inherently problematic, occasionally inescapable, but to be 
avoided to the greatest extent possible—manifests a clear ideological bent, and 
commitment to minimalist government. 
The limitations of this perspective are thrown into sharpest relief by various 
crises that followed flawed deregulation efforts: from the savings and loan crisis in 
the US in the 1980s/90s, the collapse of the California energy market in 2000-1, to 
the global financial crisis from 2008 onwards. Simply put, advocates of ‘freeing the 
market’ tend to underestimate the extent to which unregulated markets might 
misbehave—even before distributional concerns are considered. As one leading 
scholar argues, public choice can thus be criticised on the dual bases that it is 
premised on ‘a seriously incomplete and under-theorised understanding of regulatory government,’ 
while its empirical predictions are not borne out by concrete evidence of how 
regulatory agencies operate or what they achieve.116 Even if it is possible to withdraw 
the state from the so-called private sphere, there may be more acute limits to ‘rolling 
back’ its public functions via liberalisation. 
 
2. EFFICIENCY MAXIMISATION 
 
III.  
Our third ‘neoliberal’ perspective focuses more directly upon the value of 
competition. Accordingly, liberalisation might be pursued, primarily, to foster and 
deepen market forces, to better achieve the benefits of efficient markets. Here, the focus 
is not the shortcomings of the state as market participant, but instead the superiority 
of well-functioning markets as a tool for economic organisation. This perspective 
thus adheres closely to the textbook understanding of market competition, and as 
such is squarely located within the ‘more market’ camp.   
Where existing levels of competition are suboptimal, liberalisation has an 
obvious role. Most immediately, this may involve removal of legal barriers to 
participation, or structural reorganisation to facilitate competition within potentially 
contestable segments. Privatisation is often central, not because of a revulsion with 
state enterprise, but rather in an effort to enhance the managerial incentives within 
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public companies and increase competitive pressures faced.117 In the context of 
public services, ‘marketisation’ is presented as a means to achieve greater efficiency, 
affordability and choice.118 In the context of less developed economies, liberalisation 
provides an opportunity to expand markets, by, for example, increasing business 
confidence, encouraging domestic and international investment, and generating 
employment.119 At its most trenchant, this ideology may shade into so-called ‘market 
fundamentalism,’ that is, ‘the belief that markets by themselves lead to economic efficiency, that 
economic policies should focus on efficiency, and that distributional concerns could and should be 
taken care of elsewhere in the political process.’120 
This viewpoint is represented forcefully in the influential, but also infamous, 
Washington Consensus: a policy prescription a of micro- and macro-economic 
reforms for effective development, focusing on privatisation, liberalisation and 
macro-stability.121 Itself the subject of much ideological controversy,122 the 
Washington Consensus at its crudest embraces liberalisation in its most obviously 
‘neoliberal’ form, and is taken to represent ‘a set of policies predicated upon a strong faith—
stronger than warranted either by economic theory or historical experience—in unfettered markets 
and aimed at reducing, or even minimising, the role of government.’123   
Unsurprisingly, a potent criticism of this approach is a confusion of ends with 
means: namely, that the search for ‘more markets’ becomes a politically important 
goal in itself, rather than in furtherance of more nuanced or defensible social or 
economic objectives.124 The stunning growth in inequality in many of the 
developing nations that endeavoured to implement the prescriptions of the 
Washington Consensus, alongside the comparative success of other economies—
particularly in East Asia—which declined to implement its reforms, specifically in 
relation to industrial policy, stand as an uncomfortable reproach to the truism that 
markets are inevitably a better steward of societal welfare than government 
intervention.125 In an influential critique that contributed to development of a so-
called ‘post-Washington Consensus,’ Rodrik distinguished between outright denial 
of mainstream economic principles and their misuse. Rejecting market 
fundamentalism in emphatic terms as an example of the latter, he argued that: 
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Neoliberalism is to neoclassical economics as astrology is to astronomy. In 
both cases, it takes a lot of blind faith to go from one to the other.126  
 
A danger inherent in our third perspective is thus that it may follow a logical 
argument—that markets are, in theory, an efficient means to organise economic 
activity—to suboptimal, and quite illogical, conclusions. Since liberalisation, 
ultimately, affects real markets (and thus real people), its pursuit must be alive to the 
problem of ‘second best,’ which besets attempts to translate uncompromising 
theory into imperfect practice. 
 
IV.  
Our fourth perspective conceives of liberalisation as a means to create or enhance 
consumer choice, and therefore bolster consumer sovereignty.127 From this viewpoint, 
it is not merely economic actors in the sense of producers and suppliers which 
benefit from market participation; primarily, it is consumers who gain from 
engagement. The introduction or strengthening of competition is accordingly a 
means to drive innovation and other competitive forces, placing consumers in a 
stronger position to assert power over quality and price.128  This is encapsulated in 
the statutory duty of the UK’s Competition and Market Authority (CMA), which 
must ‘seek to promote competition… for the benefit of consumers.’129 A more radical version 
links consumer sovereignty, not merely to the relationship between consumers and 
producers, but relationships between individual consumers. Reliance upon the 
market mechanism to guide consumer choice enhances equal treatment, insofar as 
goods are allocated to those who value them most, and citizens are responsible for 
the costs of their actions.130 In this interpretation, the sovereign consumer is a 
libertarian one.131 
Liberalisation in all its guises is crucial to furthering consumer sovereignty from 
this perspective. Privatisation and contracting out take activities from the public to 
the private sphere, turning the passive citizen into an empowered consumer. Market 
opening, deregulation and structural reorganisation facilitate development of 
stronger competitive pressure, through removal of legal or structural market 
features which shield economic actors from the effective exercise of consumer 
sovereignty. These restructuring processes may be complemented by competition 
enforcement against firm behaviour that similarly harms consumer welfare.  
Our third and fourth perspectives thus both rely upon the benefits seen as 
inherent in the competitive process. Both fall on the ‘more markets’ side of the 
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state/market dichotomy, and both are, essentially, ‘efficiency-focused’. Yet each 
remains distinct insofar as they differ appreciably in the extent to which they 
determine the ultimate distribution of resources. Our third perspective is concerned 
with maximising total welfare, namely a combination of productive and allocative 
efficiency. It thus aligns with Chicago School thinking about the optimal focus of 
market governance, leaving distributional concerns to extra-market mechanisms 
such as taxation. The fourth perspective, by contrast, is premised upon some 
rebalancing of the benefits of the market process to advantage consumers, at the 
expense of the traditionally dominant producer.132 It suggests an emphasis on 
allocative efficiency over productive efficiency, namely getting the best deal for 
consumers. It thus requires that the market provide ‘a fair share of the resulting 
benefits’133 to consumers, whereas our third treats such considerations as beyond the 
purview of the market. To secure this, this perspective may tolerate greater levels of 
state involvement than preceding ideologies.134 
We nonetheless continue to locate this viewpoint within the ‘neoliberal’ 
bracket insofar as its underlying vision of the benefits of open and competitive 
markets contrasts with more redistributive or solidarity-based conceptions of 
markets as, principally, ‘servants of the state’s values’.135 It is therefore vulnerable to 
critiques of liberalisation as involving the imposition of a market society model upon 
public life, whereby citizenship is reduced to mere consumption of economic 
benefits and rights.136 A market-based view of citizenship conflicts with one 
premised on social solidarity, whereby the state has an inherent responsibility to 
ensure equal treatment regardless of economic resources.137 Prosser thus argued 
against a consumerist vision of citizenship because ‘we do not come to the market as 
equals,’ meaning that this theory is essentially non-egalitarian.138 Greater emphasis 
on consumer sovereignty may enhance the absolute level of consumer choice with 
respect to goods or services; but, absent some redistributive mechanism outside the 
purview of the market, it does little to attenuate existing inequalities in the ability of 
consumers to participate. Increasing the extent and competitiveness of the 
marketplace through liberalisation accordingly only generates greater choice for 
those consumers with both resources and knowledge to participate.   
An example of this inherent limitation is seen in the findings of the CMA’s 
energy market investigation. Regulatory efforts in the liberalised UK energy sector 
have focused on increasing competition through enhanced consumer 
participation—and thus consumer pressure on incumbents. Yet the inquiry found 
that the most vulnerable consumers are also those least able to exert such pressure 
and reap consequent benefits, because they are tied to the most restrictive tariffs 
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and have least knowledge and ability to exercise their rights (through switching 
etc.)139 In devising remedies, while one strand focuses on increasing levels of 
consumer sovereignty—‘helping customers to engage to exploit the benefits of competition’—
another acknowledges the intrinsic limits, and is concerned instead with ‘protecting 
customers who are less able to engage to exploit the benefits of competition.’140 
 
3. MARKET PARTICIPATION 
 
V.  
While, therefore, consumer sovereignty implies greater concern with the sharing of 
gains between enterprises and consumers than preceding perspectives, it is not 
primarily concerned with redistribution or other non-economic goals. To 
understand how liberalisation can nonetheless be relevant to the latter, we turn to 
an additional two normative perspectives which we describe as ‘participatory’. Both 
view liberalisation as a means to secure open markets, in contradistinction to closed 
sectors where considerable power, public or private, might accrue. Contestability is 
key, whether as the means to an end (perspective five) or an end itself (perspective 
six). We consider these possibilities in turn. 
Our fifth normative perspective views liberalisation, instrumentally, is as a 
means to combat private market power. As discussed in Section B, liberalisation is 
typically on the policy agenda within markets with structural or legal barriers to 
entry, which serve to protect existing market players. Here, absent effective 
competition, significant power might accrue to participants, whether due to 
monopoly, oligopoly or a de facto cartel. By facilitating entry which introduces 
countervailing competitive forces, liberalisation functions to control or reduce levels 
of private power amongst incumbents. In effect, the greater possibility for 
competition enables the breaking down, or competing away, of aggregations of 
power. From this perspective, liberalisation is a tool to prevent or lessen private 
capture, acting as a counterweight to socially-undesirable market power which might 
otherwise generate, amongst other outcomes, problematic levels of inequality. 
The ultimate objective, accordingly, is to ‘regulate’ the functioning of the 
market and guide its outcomes through competition. Instead of the State ‘picking 
winners,’ new participants challenge the accrued power of incumbents. As Behrens 
explains, “‘the market” is, therefore, the opposite of an unregulated chaos where the law of the 
powerful prevails instead of the power of the law.’141 Whilst this perspective shares attributes 
with our third and fourth categories, the core focus is quite different: instead of 
pursuing the benefits of competitive markets, the aim is to harness the impact of 
the competition process to combat private accumulations of power. If neoliberalism 
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is concerned with reconstructing the power of economic elites,142 this perspective, 
conversely, argues that the market process might break down such power. It thus 
brings to the forefront an inference inherent in the functional approach to 
liberalisation: if liberalisation represents a transition to competitive markets, merely 
removing barriers to competition is insufficient; successful liberalisation also 
requires entry and the emergence of competitive dynamics and discipline. These 
ideas are reflected eloquently in the work of Amato on the origins of antitrust, as a 
means to combat: 
 
a crucial problem for democracy: the emergence from the company or firm, as 
an expression of the fundamental freedom of individuals, of the opposite 
phenomenon of private power; a power devoid of legitimation and 
dangerously capable of infringing not just the economic freedom of other 
private individuals, but also the balance of public decisions exposed to its 
domineering strength.143  
 
Direct attacks on private power are uncommon within the discourse of 
liberalisation; perhaps because, for politicians and policymakers most concerned 
with distributional issues, liberalisation may seem a counterintuitive (or politically 
unpopular) solution. One may therefore query the extent to which this ideology has 
motivated liberalisation in practice, outside the realm of strategic antitrust 
enforcement to achieve liberalising objectives.144 
Yet at least implicit within much liberalisation occurring within privatised 
markets is a desire to increase competitive forces to counterbalance the socially 
undesirable power of the status quo. This is seen, most clearly, in liberalisation 
efforts that follow flawed privatisation, whereby a public monopoly is translated 
into a more troubling private one. The telecommunications privatisations in the UK 
and Mexico provide notable examples. Here, subsequent efforts to introduce 
competition, alongside structural reorganisation of the vertically-integrated 
incumbent, can be seen as retrospective attempts to counter the immense private 
power created by privatisation.145 Moreover, while liberalisation of professional 
services has been justified primarily on a consumer sovereignty basis—namely, 
increased allocative efficiency—, by lowering barriers to entry and participation 
liberalisation can also tackle the socially-disadvantageous market power that accrues 
to incumbents.146 In terms of legal services, for instance, so-called ‘unmet demand,’ 
resulting from supra-competitive pricing by protected incumbents, can have far 
broader consequences in terms of access to justice and fairness within society that 
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transcend the economic question of efficiency.147 Liberalisation functions to redress 
the balance. 
Again, the CMA’s energy investigation provides a neat example. To address its 
finding that the ‘big six’ suppliers were each able to exercise unilateral market 
power,148 the CMA made a series of recommendations to secure more effective 
competition specifically to challenge this existing power. These include reform of 
licensing requirements for retail suppliers, removing existing restrictions on 
differentiated offerings and innovative market behaviour.149 The investigation is 
notable, furthermore, insofar as it was motivated by public concern about the 
structure and functioning of—liberalised, but highly regulated—energy markets, 
particularly popular outrage regarding perceived undue power and consequent 
unfair behaviour. One option here would be to regulate more stringently;150 the 
preferred approach of the CMA was to empower the market to fix itself.   
 
VI.  
Finally, a sixth approach views liberalisation primarily as a means to facilitate 
participation in liberalised sectors. The perspectives discussed thus far have focused 
upon how increased involvement makes the market work better, or improves 
resulting outcomes. Yet an alternative viewpoint is to consider the experience of 
new participants, and the benefits that they derive from opportunities to partake in 
and contribute to the competition process. Instead of fostering entry to achieve 
some subsequent goal, this perspective derives value from the very possibility of 
greater participation following liberalisation. Schweitzer, drawing parallels to the EU 
law concept of solidarity, sums up this viewpoint as: ‘the principle that economic 
opportunities shall be open to all.’151   
Such ideas are associated closely the school of thought known as 
ordoliberalism.152 Among other themes, this is held to support a ‘right’ for 
individuals to compete within the marketplace, free from political interference yet 
backstopped by strong state protection for open competition.153 From this 
perspective, economic freedom is closely linked to political freedom. Although the 
precise implications of ordoliberalism are disputed,154 this perspective is distinct 
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from Chicago School approaches to the competitive process, which would generally 
support a positive right for competitors only where this increases efficiency. 
Liberalisation, from this perspective, aligns with ordoliberal thinking insofar as it 
applies state power to unlock or reinforce the marketplace, realising individual 
economic freedom, yet without prejudging the competition process.155 Under this 
viewpoint, strengthening individual economic rights is a task of general interest.156 
Our participatory understandings of liberalisation overlap insofar as both 
emphasise market pluralism, secured by opening sectors to competitive forces.157 
Where they diverge is in terms of the ultimate reason for participation: whereas the 
ordoliberal conception of plurality stresses the right of (even inefficient) economic 
actors to compete as a value in itself—what Foucault characterised as competition 
as essence158—, the market power perspective treats competition instrumentally as the 
counterbalance to a less desirable alternative. Furthermore, while there are those—
notably Foucault himself159—who treat ordoliberalism as a form of neoliberalism, 
this viewpoint remains distinct from the first four rationales considered. Not only 
can ordoliberalism be distinguished from contemporary understandings of 
neoliberalism insofar as it theorises the state as an instrument to enforce market 
processes, independent of democratic legitimation if necessary;160 additionally, 
Foucault’s critique was formulated before the great majority of contemporary 
liberalisation occurred. The outer boundaries of what conceivably falls within the 
category of liberalisation today are, for better or worse, much more expansive; the 
‘radical economic state’161 a starker construct. There is obvious complementarity with 
our fourth perspectives, consumer sovereignty, insofar as each prioritises an element 
of the interaction between consumption and production that underlies any market: 
consumers on the one hand, economic actors on the other. Yet this final perspective 
turns the orthodox understanding of markets—that production is about means and 
consumption about ends162—on its head. From this viewpoint, the opportunity to 
participate is an end itself.   
Ordoliberalism is afforded a central role in the perceived intellectual 
underpinnings of market governance within the EU.163 Securing ‘market access’ for 
potential competitors is, correspondingly, the lynchpin of liberalisation, whether 
through negative or positive integration. The fundamental freedoms have been 
applied to attack, inter alia, domestic measures that entrench public ownership,164 
protect monopoly rights165 or limit basic parameters of enterprise freedom like 
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pricing,166 all on the basis that such regulation hinders access to national 
components of the single market. Competition law, similarly, prohibits not only 
behaviour that diminishes consumer welfare, but also harms ‘the structure of the market 
and, in doing so, competition as such,’167 thus implicitly endorsing the notion that 
participation itself is valuable. Positive liberalisation efforts—adopted across a 
diverse range of activities including telecommunications, energy, transport, and 
services—typically require removal of any monopoly or special rights granted to 
incumbents, thus ensuring that markets are open to future competition. Where 
structural conflicts of interest exist, which may facilitate exclusion of new entrants 
by established players, some degree of market reorganisation may be mandated. Yet 
an irony for those who critique EU liberalisation as a ‘neoliberal’ phenomenon is 
that such efforts can, in fact, generate considerable inefficiency,168 while the viability 
of future competition appears to be less important than its potentiality.169 Thus, the 
focus of the liberalisation agenda is squarely upon building a distinct ‘European 
market’ within which participation is prioritised.170 
Beyond its apparent tolerance for inefficiency, a final contrasting objection 
may be levelled against this ideology. Specifically, the impact of ordoliberalism has 
been identified in a critical tension between EU and (some) Member State 
preferences with respect to liberalisation: namely, that the latter work on the 
assumption that broader general interest is better served by collective ‘public’ 
approaches to market activity and governance, rather than strengthening of (self-
interested) private individual rights.171 While our final perspective is far from the 
extreme of market fundamentalism, it nonetheless finds inherent value in the market 
by virtue of the importance of participation.  Such a perspective is fundamentally at 
odds with any viewpoint that rejects the market per se, and remains difficult to 
reconcile with critiques of the shortcomings of the market mechanism and its 
outcomes in practice. For better or worse, any normative argument for liberalisation 
as such has at its core a concomitant preference for markets as the basis for 
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This paper has sought to delineate and develop our understanding of the pervasive, 
yet vague, concept of liberalisation. The task is complicated by the intricate nature 
of its underlying premises: for many, liberalisation implies not merely a practical 
process of market reform, but moreover a higher-level vision of how markets fit 
within society. Debates surrounding liberalisation are, consequently, often 
formulated in the most forthright of terms, as in van Miert’s vivid juxtaposition of 
sclerotic and inefficient state intervention against a dogmatic ‘liberalisation machine’.172 
Yet it is difficult to disagree with Bekkedal’s plea for moderation on the basis that 
‘the vision of the legal system is somewhat more sophisticated than to establish as much competition 
as possible.’173 
Just as there can be no successful ‘one-size-fits-all’ strategy for liberalisation 
policies,174 so too is there no single reason why liberalisation does or should—or 
should not—occur. As considered in Section C, a distinction can be drawn between 
concrete objectives and underlying ideology. Implicitly, any policy choice to 
liberalise involves two levels of decision-making: first, a technical choice relating to 
the optimal regulatory means to achieve the market outcome desired; and second, a 
higher-level choice proactively to alter the existing balance between public power, 
private power and some ‘essential’ notion of competition and the market 
mechanism within a wider social context. The contribution of this work has focused 
on the latter, exploring the potential normative currents that may underlie and 
inform liberalisation efforts. From the outset, our purpose has been primarily 
taxonomical: to identify and explain both the technical processes and potential 
ideological concerns—and, beyond, their interrelationship—which constitute the 
concept of liberalisation. Moreover, the normative perspectives discussed here are 
not claimed to be exhaustive in scope; instead, this paper reflects simply a first 
attempt to give greater content and clarity to the oft-repeated claim that 
liberalisation is an ideologically-charged phenomenon.   
Yet the potential implications of this assessment are greater than that of a 
simple mapping exercise. A clearer understanding of the normative goals that 
motivate any liberalising intervention permits a more nuanced assessment of its 
effects and thus its success. We cannot truly determine whether a market reform 
has been effective in its own terms unless and until we appreciate its underlying 
motivations, in addition to its verifiable market impacts. It may, of course, be 
queried whether those underlying normative goals are worthy of pursuit—but that 
is a political rather than a scientific objection. The perennially-disputed question of 
the success or otherwise of privatisation of the UK railways, for instance, is arguably 
only fully understood when normative goals are considered alongside the mass of 
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quantitative data that privatisation has and continues to generate. The claim is not 
that ideology legitimates policymaking, nor that acknowledging normative context 
makes the practical task of achieving reform more straightforward. It does, however, 
give us a more nuanced appreciation of what market processes are intended to 
achieve within a broader societal context, thus serving to bridge the gap between 
technical instruments of liberalisation and the expressions of political will that these 
ostensibly represent. The normative rationale behind any liberalisation effort 
indicates the vision of the relationship between market, consumers, businesses and 
state that is eventually envisaged; hence it provides a pivotal additional blueprint 
against which to assess realisation of any liberalisation project.   
It is thus impossible, and arguably would be undesirable, to sever practice from 
underlying ideology in the context of liberalisation. While both practice and theory 
have been critiqued based on presumed allegiance to a neoliberal agenda,175 this 
article has sought to demonstrate that the issues at stake are more nuanced. Thus 
the limits of liberalisation comprise not only the limits of the market in philosophical 
terms—‘what money can’t buy’176—but also its limits, or perhaps limitations, in 
economic terms. 
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